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Abstract
It was highlighted in the literature that Islamic banks’ equity financing was
very risky in practice. Theoretically, equity financing could boost Islamic banks’
profitability because the riskier financial instrument was always associated
with the greater return that could be created. Using a sample of nine Islamic
banks in Indonesia from 2009m1 to 2014m12, interestingly we found that higher
proportion of equity financing was significantly associated with lower Islamic
banks’ profitability. However, this negative relationship diminished in the case
of large Islamic banks, implying that the negative effect of equity financing on
Islamic banks’ profitability was more prominent for small banks rather than for
large banks. Our results were robust using various estimations. Although eq-
uity financing was a core of Islamic banks and could differ Islamic from conven-
tional banks’ activities but Islamic banks altogether with policymakers should
evaluate this instrument for the sake of Islamic banks’ profitability and its pros-
pects in the future.
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Abstrak
Telah dibahas di dalam literatur bahwa pembiayaan berbasis ekuitas oleh bank Syariah
pada praktiknya sangat berisiko. Secara teori, pembiayaan berbasis ekuitas dapat
meningkatkan profitabilitas bank Syariah karena instrumen keuangan yang berisiko
selalu dikaitkan dengan kemungkinan tingkat pengembalian yang lebih besar. Dengan
menggunakan sampel sembilan bank Syariah dari 2009m1 sampai 2014m12, secara
menarik kami menemukan bahwa tingginya proporsi pembiayaan berbasis ekuitas secara
signifikan berhubungan negatif dengan profitabilitas bank Syariah. Akan tetapi,
hubungan negatif ini berkurang pada kasus bank Syariah yang besar. Hal ini
mengindikasikan bahwa efek negatif pembiayaan berbasis ekuitas pada profitabilitas
bank Syariah lebih terasa pada bank Syariah yang kecil. Hasil kami tidak berubah
walau kami uji menggunakan beberapa estimasi yang berbeda. Meskipun pembiayaan
berbasis ekuitas adalah inti dari bank Syariah dan dapat membedakan aktivitas bank
Syariah dari bank konvensional, namun bank Syariah bersama dengan pemangku
kebijakan harus mengevaluasi kembali instrumen pembiayaan ini demi profitabilitas
bank Syariah dan prospeknya di masa depan.
Kata Kunci: Pembiayaan Berbasis Ekuitas; Bank Syariah; Profitabilitas
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The creation of Islamic Development Bank in 1975
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, has become the Islamic
banks’ history. It has become the pioneer of the es-
tablishment of other Islamic banks that now wide-
spread all around the world especially in the pre-
dominantly Muslim countries. Operating with Is-
lamic values which are rooted in the Quran and
Sunnah, Islamic banks contribute to the development
of Islamic finance sector which in 2016 has $2.2 tril-
lion in assets. Islamic finance is expected to grow
by 9.4 percent to reach $3.8 trillion in the next 2022
(Thomson Reuters, 2017).
Similar to their conventional counterparts, Is-
lamic banks have a function of financial intermedia-
tion. They collect money from the clients (deposi-
tors) in order to be used to finance other clients
(entrepreneur) using a form of lending or financ-
ing. This paper studies financing method of Islamic
banks which is obviously different to their conven-
tional peers because of Islamic values they use. To
finance business, Islamic banks are prohibited to use
debt arrangement as in conventional banks. Instead,
various methods are derived from the Islamic law
to facilitate Islamic banks in serving their clients.
Financing using equity arrangement, or simply eq-
uity financing, is one of the methods in Islamic banks’
lending that believed to be the backbone of Islamic
finance. It is expected as a replacement of debt-based
arrangement. It is the representation of the main
principle of Islamic banks, which is profit-and-loss-
sharing or PLS. Thus, one could say that equity fi-
nancing and PLS financing by definition is the same.
In this financing method, banks act as an in-
vestor who provides the fund or capital to the en-
trepreneur or banks’ client. An entrepreneur could
not guarantee that they will give steady return to
their investor (Islamic banks) because the money
takes the form of capital, not debt. From the banks’
point of view, this instrument is very risky. Because
of inconsistent return payment, Islamic banks sub-
ject to the high volatility of income. This is why
Hamza & Saadaoui (2013) argue that in some extent
equity financing could deteriorate banks’ stability.
Also, Abdul-Rahman et al. (2014) highlight that PLS-
related instruments are subject to the agency prob-
lem because entrepreneurs could have less incen-
tive to put more effort on their business and also
they are more likely to report lower profit to the
banks or even hiding the actual profit from the banks.
By employing equity financing in their business, Is-
lamic banks also could not require collateral from
their client because collateral is prohibited in the
Islamic law although there are many cases that Is-
lamic banks ask collateral for their financing
(Aggarwal & Yousef, 2000). Equity financing con-
sists of mudaraba (profit sharing) and musharaka (part-
nership). The former differs from the latter regard-
ing the contribution of the capital. Mudaraba con-
tract allows entrepreneurs to use all Islamic banks’
fund (the capital 100 percent from Islamic banks)
whereas musharaka require entrepreneurs to allocate
some of their funds to the project. Either mudaraba
or musharaka havehigh risk profile from the banks
perspective, although the former might be less risky
than the latter.
For above-mentioned reasons, equity financ-
ing is less popular for Islamic banks. Based on the
data of Risfandy (2018), the average proportion of
equity financing in countries where Islamic banks
operate is less than 8 percent. Some banks even do
not employ this type of financing at all. For most of
the banks, they enjoy using markup financing. The
most popular is murabaha or resale with a stated
profit. Although criticized by many Islamic schol-
ars (Aggarwal & Yousef, 2000), murabaha is still wide-
spread in Islamic banks up to now because it is
“collateral-by-contract” so that Islamic banks do not
need to ask collateral from their clients anymore. It
is less risky, less need for monitoring, and more
applicable to the real banking work today.
This paper therefore questions whether eq-
uity financing that derived from Islamic banks main
principle could facilitate better Islamic banks per-
formance. More specifically, we investigate whether
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Islamic banks profitability is also determined by the
activity of equity financing in Islamic banks. Because
equity financing is very risky as highlighted earlier,
Islamic banks should have strong reason to use this
instrument. Indeed, Risfandy et al. (2018) provide
empirical evidence that Islamic banks use equity fi-
nancing to face the pressure of banking market com-
petition. Equity financing is believed could attract
more entrepreneurs to join Islamic banks as a client.
This paper thus will contribute to the literature in
several respects. First, this paper contributes to the
discussion of the equity financing application in Is-
lamic banks. Even though become the main differ-
ence of Islamic banks to their conventional rivals,
equity financing is rarely explored possibly because
of the unavailability or completeness data. Prior
research has investigated equity financing and its
relation with the institutional environment (Alam
& Parinduri, 2017), Shariah Supervisory Board
(Risfandy, 2018), Competition and bank fundamen-
tals (Risfandy et al., 2018), and efficiency (Othman,
Abdul-Majid, & Abdul-Rahman, 2017). Second, to
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
that investigates the impact of equity financing on
Islamic banks profitability. Prior works often inves-
tigate Islamic banks equity financing as a dependent
variable (Risfandy, 2018) while in this paper we ex-
amine its determinants. Third, because equity financ-
ing in Indonesian is considered as the highest among
countries having Islamic banks (Abedifar, Molyneux,
& Tarazi, 2013), the finding from this study will be
very meaningful to either policymakers or regula-
tors. Equity financing is crucial in Islamic banks and
could impact their stability (Hamza & Saadaoui, 2013)
so that the intensive monitoring might be needed.
METHODS
We retrieve data of Islamic and conventional
banks from their balance sheet and income state-
ment that published publicly in the website of the
central bank of Indonesia (Bank Indonesia). We
choose a period from 2009m1 to 2014m12. Even
though this paper mainly investigates Islamic banks’
equity financing, we use both conventional and Is-
lamic banks particularly when we compute Lerner
index as a proxy for market competition or market
power. This is because both banks type are indeed
in the similar market so that computing Lerner in-
dex by using only Islamic banks could be biased (
Meslier, Risfandy, & Tarazi, 2017b). After creating
all variables, they are winsorized at the 1 percent
and 99 percent percentile to eliminate outliers. Our
final sample consists of 442 observations from 9 In-
donesian Islamic banks; Bank BCA Syariah, Bank
BNI Syariah, Bank BRI Syariah, Bank BJB Syariah,
Bank Muamalat, Bank Syariah Mandiri, Bank
Maybank Syariah, Bank Mega Syariah, and Bank
Victoria Syariah.
This paper uses the following econometric
model to examine the relationship between equity
financing and profitability of Islamic banks. ܴܱܣ݅ݐ = ߙ + ߚ1ܧݍܨ݅݊݅ݐ + ߚ2ܮ݁ݎ݊݁݅ݎ ݐ + ߚ3ܮ݋ܽ݊ܶܣ݅ݐ+ ߚ4ܦ݁݌ܮܾ݅ܽ݅ݐ + ߚ5ܩݎܶܣ݅ݐ + ߚ6݋ܮ݋݃ܶܣ݆ݐ + ߝ݅ݐ  (1)
Where subscripts i and t represent bank and
time dimension respectively. Profitability is our de-
pendent variable. It is proxy by ROAit (return-on-
assets) as a widely used measure of profitability.
We also use ROEit (return-on-equity) for robustness.
Our measures follow most of the previous works in
bank profitability such as Tran, Lin, & Nguyen (2016)
and Trinugroho et al. (2017) among others.
In the right-hand side, we use a ratio of eq-
uity financing (sum of mudaraba and musharaka fi-
nancing) to total financing as our main variable of
interest (EqFinit). We also employ an alternative
measure for robustness, EqFin_Altit, defined as the
ratio of equity financing to total assets. This vari-
able is consistent with prior works on the similar
topic (Alam & Parinduri, 2017; Risfandy, 2018;
Othman, Abdul-Majid, & Abdul-Rahman, 2017).
Because the application of equity financing is related
with a high risk that Islamic banks should bear
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Previous literature has highlighted several
variables as determinants of bank profitability. We
will consider these variables as a control in our
model. The first control we use in this paper is
Lerner index (Lerner it). This is consistent with
Yanikkaya, Gümüº, & Pabuçcu (2018). A higher
Lerner index is linked with higher market power
or lower competition. Thus, a positive sign is ex-
pected from Lerner because banks generally could
generate more profit when Islamic banks have mo-
nopoly power that usually can be achieved in the
less competitive market. To calculate Lerner index,
we follow Fu, Lin, & Molyneux (2014) by employ-
ing trans logarithm equation with two-factor prices.
The second variable is a ratio of loan to total assets
which can represent asset composition (Ahamed,
2017) or liquidity (Yanikkaya, Gümüº, & Pabuçcu,
2018). Islamic banks that allocate more loan is pre-
dicted to have greater profitability (Yanikkaya,
Gümüº, & Pabuçcu, 2018). Therefore, a positive as-
sociation is expected. The next controls we use in
this paper is total customer deposit to total liabili-
ties ratio following Chen, Liang, & Yu (2018). We
also use asset growth (GrTAit) following Stiroh &
Rumble (2006) and Chen, Liang, & Yu (2018). A posi-
tive sign from GrTAit is expected because banks that
grow rapidly are more likely to have greater prof-
itability ratio. Orthogonalized form of the natural
logarithm of banks’ total assets (oLogTAit) is widely
used to proxy Islamic banks’ size as well as in this
paper. An issue whether Islamic banks should stay
small or should be bigger has been debated in the
prior works. Cihak & Hesse (2010) empirically show
that small Islamic banks perform better than the large
ones whereas Ibrahim & Rizvi (2017) find a contra-
dictory result. We therefore do not make a predic-
tion of the sign of oLogTAit.
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of
all variables used in this study. The average value
of ROA and ROE are 2 percent and 17 percent re-
spectively. Equity financing has great proportion in
Indonesia as suggested by some studies (Abedifar,
Variable Explanation Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
ROA Return on Assets to proxy profitability 442 0.021 0.013 -0.005 0.036 
ROE Return on Equity to as alternative profitability 
proxy 
442 0.174 0.116 -0.020 0.293 
EqFin Equity financing. Computed as a ratio of Equity 
mode of financing (mudaraba and musharaka) to 
total financing. 
442 0.307 0.203 0.004 0.852 
EqFin_Alt Alternative proxy of equity financing, computed 
by dividing equity financing to total assets. 
442 0.204 0.139 0.004 0.671 
Lerner Lerner index to proxy banks’ market power or 
competition following  Yanikkaya, Gümüş, & 
Pabuçcu (2018). 
442 0.452 0.082 0.230 0.710 
LoanTA Loan to total assets ratio to proxy asset 
composition (Ahamed, 2017) 
442 0.691 0.138 0.346 0.801 
EqTA Equity to total assets to proxy bank solvency risk 
following Chen, Liang, & Yu (2018) and Meslier, 
Tacneng, & Tarazi (2014) 
442 0.143 0.087 0.072 0.464 
DepLiab Ratio of customer deposit to total bank liabilities 
following Chen, Liang, & Yu (2018) 
442 0.919 0.058 0.711 0.984 
GrTA Growth of total assets following  Chen, Liang, & 
Yu (2018) 
442 0.024 0.040 -0.052 0.107 
oLogTA Orthogonalized form of natural logarithm of total 
assets 
442 -0.090 0.606 -1.216 1.003 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
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 EqFin Lerner LoanTA EqTA DepLiab GrTA oLogTA 
EqFin 1      
1 
Lerner -0.081 1     
LoanTA -0.226 0.003 1    
EqTA -0.035 0.215 -0.434 1   
DepLiab -0.060 0.050 -0.010 -0.193 1  
GrTA 0.060 -0.062 0.020 0.044 -0.042 1 
oLogTA 0.219 0.135 0.348 -0.590 0.115 -0.058 
 
Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013; Risfandy, 2018). Our av-
erage value is 30 percent for EqFin and 20 percent for
EqFin_Alt. Lerner index of Indonesian banks is also
considered high consistent to Cupian & Abduh (2017).
With an average value 0.45, it means that Indonesian
Islamic banks in average could set the price of their
product 45 percent over their marginal costs. In av-
erage, our data shows that Islamic banks in Indone-
sia have 69 percent loan or 14 percent equity as a
proportion of their assets. Deposit to liability ratio
has a mean value of 91 percent. The growth rate of
Islamic banks’ assets is 2 percent on average.
The correlation matrix is shown in Table 2 in
order to see whether there is multicollinearity prob-
lem between our independent variables. The high-
est score of correlation is -0.59, that is, the correla-
tion between EqTA and oLogTA. For some research-
ers, this value could be considered as high. How-
ever, our size measure has been orthogonalized,
meaning that we have strived to decrease its corre-
lation value. We opt to include oLogTA in the model
because bank size is a “must-be-there” control vari-
able. Its role is very important in the model. It could
lead to omitted variable bias problem if we do not
put it there. Moreover, we have tested the VIF (Vari-
ance Inflation Factor) score (not shown) and it sug-
gests that there is no multicollinearity problem be-
cause all values are far below the rule of thumb 10.
RESULTS
Baseline Result
We first present the result of our baseline re-
gression. It is displayed in Table 3. All of our ex-
planatory variables are significant, implying that our
model is sufficient enough to explain bank profit-
ability. We also include time fixed effect in the model
to control time changes. The heteroscedasticity prob-
lem is also diminished because we use robust stan-
dard errors. Surprisingly, the variable EqFin which
represent the proportion of equity financing in Is-
lamic banks shows negative sign. This is different
from our prediction. This result suggests that higher
equity financing activities in Islamic banks decrease
bank profitability. This evidence could be linked
with the real-world application of equity financing
in Islamic banks. Most of the Islamic banks rarely
use such kind of financing because of the risk em-
bedded on them. We empirically find that although
theoretically risky, equity financing could not fos-
ter Islamic banks profitability.
Table 3. Baseline Result
Table 2. Correlation Matrix
 Dep. Var. = ROA 
  Coef. t-stat. 
EqFin -0.0177*** (-5.27) 
Lerner 0.0307*** (3.32) 
LoanTA -0.0145** (-2.50) 
EqTA -0.0390*** (-3.05) 
DepLiab -0.0347** (-2.47) 
GrTA -0.0444** (-2.01) 
oLogTA 0.00241* (1.76) 
Constant  0.0760*** (5.74) 
Time FE Yes 
Robust SE Yes 
N  442 
R-sq. 0.272 
Notes: ***, **, and * denotes significance in 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent levels respectively 
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We then move to the control variables. First,
as predicted, Lerner index is positively associated
with profitability. A bank with a high market power
is associated with greater profitability because they
are able to set the higher price of banking product
than low market power banks. In the less competi-
tive market, banks can generate a high profit be-
cause of their monopoly power. Our result is slightly
different to Yanikkaya, Gümüº, & Pabuçcu (2018).
They find a negative impact of Lerner index for Is-
lamic banks sub-sample whereas a positive sign is
obtained from the conventional ones. Yanikkaya,
Gümüº, & Pabuçcu (2018) argue that this could be
due to the lack of differentiated products and this
low market share of Islamic banks. Our result dif-
fers to them probably because of the sample.
Yanikkaya, Gümüº, & Pabuçcu (2018) use OIC coun-
tries which differs each other. We use only Indone-
sia, and Indonesian market is assumed to be less
competitive and more concentrated compared to the
other countries (Cho, 1990; Risfandy et al., 2017).
Second, LoanTA that we use to measure asset
composition significantly and negatively affect ROA.
Although higher loan ratio is often related to the
aggressivity of banks that could boost profitability,
our empirical testing proposes the different result.
Our result then differs to Ahamed (2017). The plau-
sible explanation behind this phenomenon could be
because Muslims generally are risk-averse
(Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013), banks could
not benefits from giving more loans to their Mus-
lim entrepreneurs.
Third, we find a negative association between
capital ratio proxy by equity to total assets (EqTA)
and bank profitability. Holding greater capital for
Islamic banks could reflect their risk-averse behav-
ior (Stiroh & Rumble, 2006). This will decrease Is-
lamic banks’ probability to engage in a risky project
that possibly leads more return to the bank. Islamic
banks are not permitted to invest in high-risk fi-
nancial products in order to comply with Islamic
law (Chen, Liang, & Yu, 2018).
Fourth, consistent to Chen, Liang, & Yu
(2018), we find a negative sign from DepLiab and
GrTA, indicating that greater deposit proportion
over liabilities and higher growth rate of banks’ total
assets is related to lower profitability. High growth
banks usually experienced by small and relatively
new banks. Such banks will have less profitability
because they have high investment opportunity so
that they should allocate a great proportion of their
profit for retained earnings. This evidence is
strengthened by another variable in our model, that
is, size. Proxy by the natural logarithm of total as-
sets, it has a positive sign, indicates that larger banks
have significantly higher profitability. This result
confirms Ibrahim & Rizvi (2017).
Further Analysis
In this paper we further investigate whether
the impact of equity financing on bank performance
is altered by bank size. The application of equity
financing in Islamic bank could depend on Islamic
bank size because small banks in reality concentrate
on low-risk investment and fee income whereas
larger banks do more PLS related business (Cihak
& Hesse, 2010). We augment equation (1) into the
following equation (2) to accommodate the issue. ܴܱܣ݅ݐ = ߙ + ߚ1ܧݍܨ݅݊݅ݐ + ߚ2ܮ݁ݎ݊݁݅ݎ ݐ ∗ ݋ܮ݋݃ܶܣ݆ݐ+ ߚ3ܮ݋ܽ݊ܶܣ݅ݐ + ߚ4ܧݍܶܣ݅ݐ + ߚ4ܦ݁݌ܮ݅ܽ ܾ݅ݐ+ ߚ5ܽ ܩݎܶܣ݅ݐ + ߚ6݋ܮ݋݃ܶܣ݆ݐ + ߝ݅ݐ  (2)
We present the result in Table 4. We do find
that bank size moderates the association between
EqFin and ROA. Specifically, the positive result from
the interaction variable suggests that the negative
impact of EqFin is lowered when Islamic banks
larger. We could also see from the Wald test, in the
small banks, the coefficient is -0.0391. The value
decreases to -0.0187 when Islamic banks reach me-
dium size. In the large banks, equity financing is
positively impacting bank performance but it is not
statistically significant. This evidence implies that
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bank size in Islamic banks’ case has a great role to
maintain its profitability and stability as suggested
 Dep. Var. = ROA 
 Coef. t-stat. 
EqFin x oLogTA 0.0304*** (3.65) 
oLogTA -0.0137*** (-4.24) 
EqFin 0.0346*** (3.96) 
Lerner -0.00408 (-0.66) 
LoanTA -0.0282** (-2.07) 
EqTA -0.0222 (-1.49) 
DepLiab -0.0421* (-1.96) 
GrTA -0.00728** (-2.54) 
Constant 0.0508*** (3.23) 
EqFin when oLogTA small (oLogTA<p25) -0.0391*** (-5.18) 
EqFin when oLogTA medium (p25 <oLogTA< p75) -0.0187*** (-5.41) 
EqFin when oLogTA high (oLogTA>p75) 0.00606 0.945 
Time FE Yes 
Robust SE Yes 
N  442 
R-sq. 0.305 
Notes: ***, **, and * denotes significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ROA ROA ROA ROE 
EqFin -0.0177*** -0.0154***  -0.103*** 
 (-5.10) (-5.66)  (-4.31) 
EqFin_Alt   -0.0158***  
   (-3.44)  
Lerner 0.0307*** 0.0343*** 0.0343*** 0.204*** 
 (3.53) (4.06) (3.59) (2.77) 
LoanTA -0.0145*** -0.0132** -0.00198 -0.0539 
 (-2.69) (-2.36) (-0.33) (-1.32) 
EqTA -0.0390*** -0.0555*** -0.0391*** -0.822*** 
 (-3.42) (-4.99) (-2.90) (-9.17) 
DepLiab -0.0347*** -0.0449*** -0.0364** -0.336*** 
 (-2.95) (-3.41) (-2.50) (-3.46) 
GrTA -0.0444** -0.0453*** -0.0482** -0.354** 
 (-2.44) (-2.85) (-2.10) (-2.23) 
oLogTA 0.00241* 0.00137 0.00121 0.0150 
 (1.66) (1.08) (0.86) (1.54) 
Constant 0.0760*** 0.0697*** 0.0651*** 0.667*** 
 (5.29) (5.55) (4.74) (7.46) 
Year FE Yes No Yes Yes 
Robust SE No Yes Yes Yes 
N  442 442 442 442 
R-sq. 0.272 0.216 0.241 0.487 
Notes: ***, **, and * denotes significance in 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively 
 
in Ibrahim & Rizvi (2017) and Trinugroho et al.
(2017).
Table 4. Equity Financing, Bank Size, and Profitability
Table 5. Various Robustness Checks
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Robustness Checks
To check whether our results are strong, we
conduct several robustness tests. Results are dis-
played in Table 5. In column (1), we estimate the
model without using robust standard errors
whereas in column (2) we do not consider year fixed
effect. The results are similar. Variable EqFin still
negatively and significantly affect ROA. In column
(3), we change our main dependent variable EqFin
with our alternative proxy, EqFin_Alt but the result
still does not change. In the last column, instead of
using ROA to proxy bank profitability, we use ROE.
A similar result is also obtained.
regression. We therefore estimate equation (1) us-
ing two most popular panel data regression, fixed
effect (FE) and random effect (RE). The results are
showed in Table 6. We do find that changing esti-
mation techniques do not alter affect our main re-
sult. EqFin is significant either using fixed effect (col-
umn 1) or random effect (column 2) method. We do
find some different result for our controls especially
from the fixed effect method. However, as our
Hausman test show insignificant result (p-value
0.99), we should rely on the random effect rather
than the fixed effect.
DISCUSSION
From the empirical result we obtain, we no-
tice an interesting result to be discussed. It is em-
pirically proven in our work that total assets are an
important determinant of profitability. The discus-
sion about whether small or large Islamic banks are
better has been rooted in the literature. The most
interesting question is that do large Islamic banks
are associated with better stability? A study from
Èihák & Hesse (2010) starts the discussion by em-
pirically showing that small Islamic banks tend to
be more stable than both large Islamic and conven-
tional banks. Additionally, they also find that large
Islamic banks are relatively less stable than large
conventional banks. Interestingly, Èihák & Hesse
(2010) also argue that PLS activities are only suit-
able for large Islamic banks. The debate continues.
Ibrahim & Rizvi (2017) empirically find that larger
Islamic banks are more stable especially after they
reach a particular size. This indeed contradicts with
the previous finding. In this paper, regarding the
bank size, we find two results. First, we find that
larger banks have better profitability. Because they
are large, they have greater incentives to make a
profit. Second, we also find that negative impact of
Islamic banks’ PLS activities could be reduced in the
larger Islamic banks. Our findings strengthen the
issue that bank size matters for Islamic banks but
researchers do not have one single view about its
impact on Islamic banks stability and performance.
  FE RE 
 (1) (2) 
EqFin 0.00733** -0.0177*** 
 (2.27) (-5.14) 
Lerner -0.00190 0.0307*** 
 (-0.42) (3.53) 
LoanTA -0.00839** -0.0145*** 
 (-2.36) (-2.71) 
EqTA -0.0290*** -0.0389*** 
 (-2.75) (-3.42) 
DepLiab 0.00433 -0.0349*** 
 (0.60) (-2.98) 
GrTA 0.00865 -0.0443** 
 (1.02) (-2.44) 
oLogTA 0.0207*** 0.00243* 
 (5.08) (1.68) 
Constant 0.0161* 0.0609*** 
 (1.91) (4.70) 
Hausman Test 
FE vs. RE  0.99 
Year FE Yes Yes 
N  442 442 
R-sq. within 0.392  
R-sq. overall   0.271 
Notes: ***, **, and * denotes significance in 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent levels respectively 
 
Table 6. Robustness: Panel Data Regression
Next, we check whether using other estima-
tion techniques will change the result. Our data var-
ies over cross-section (bank i) and time series (time
t). Econometricians might suggest that the most
appropriate analysis for our data type is panel data
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS
Conclusion
In this work, we examine the determinant of
bank profitability from the Islamic perspective. Spe-
cifically, we examine whether the PLS instrument that
is translated into the equity financing could enhance
bank profitability. We find a negative relation between
equity financing and profitability of Islamic banks.
Instead of increasing profitability, equity financing is
found to be decreasing profitability. Although such
mode of financing is very risky, it could not boost
bank profitability. Nevertheless, we also find that such
negative impact decrease in the large Islamic banks. It
confirms prior study that PLS activities are more ap-
propriate for the large banks since it is categorized as
risky instruments (Cihak& Hesse, 2010).
Suggestions
Our result calls the policymakers to look again
at the practice of equity financing especially in In-
donesia. This is because equity financing is not em-
pirically proven to increase Islamic banks profitabil-
ity. Based on our data, equity financing constitutes
30% of total financing. Failed application of equity
financing could significantly deteriorate Islamic
banks’ stability which could lead to the instability
of the whole country banking system. Equity financ-
ing indeed could be a prominent difference between
Islamic banks and their conventional one but it
should be regulated and monitored in a detailed
manner by both policymakers and regulators in or-
der to maintain country financial stability.
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